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Abstract
In recent years, cognitive Internet of Things (CIoT) has received considerable
attention because it can extract valuable information from various Internet of
Things (IoT) devices. In CIoT, truth discovery plays an important role in iden-
tifying truthful values from large scale data to help CIoT provide deeper insights
and value from collected information. However, the privacy concerns of IoT de-
vices pose a major challenge in designing truth discovery approaches. Although
existing schemes of truth discovery can be executed with strong privacy guar-
antees, they are not efficient or cannot be applied in real-life CIoT applications.
This article proposes a novel framework for lightweight and privacy-preserving
truth discovery called LPTD-I, which is implemented by incorporating fog and
cloud platforms, and adopting the homomorphic Paillier encryption and one-
way hash chain techniques. This scheme not only protects devices’ privacy, but
also achieves high efficiency. Moreover, we introduce a fault tolerant (LPTD-II)
framework which can effectively overcome malfunctioning CIoT devices. De-
tailed security analysis indicates the proposed schemes are secure under a com-
prehensively designed threat model. Experimental simulations are also carried
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out to demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed schemes.
Keywords: CIoT; truth discovery; lightweight, privacy-preserving.
1. Introduction
Cognitive Internet of Things (CIoT) is a specialized IoT model which capital-
izes on the increasing capabilities of mobile devices (with built-in comprehensive
sensor sets), which uses cognitive computing techniques to find valuable infor-
mation from large scale sensing data [1, 2, 3]. By analyzing the big data created
by various IoT devices, CIoT is able to provide deeper insights, high-level intel-
ligence, and further create values for people.
Despite the proliferation of CIoT, there are some increasing concerns which
may impede its wide adoption. For example, the sensory data captured and pro-
vided by different devices is usually not directly usable or reliable, as it may be
distorted due to reasons such as, lack of sensor calibration, poor sensor quality,
background noise, and even the intent to deceive. Therefore, an important task
of the CIoT applications is to discover truthful information from the sensory
data. This task, called truth discovery, has drawn significant attention [4, 5, 6].
Typically, the common principle to execute truth discovery is weighted aggre-
gation that assigns a higher weight to a particular device if data reported by it
is closer to the aggregated results from all devices. Moreover, a device’s data is
given higher value if the device has higher weight due to its past performance
[7, 8]. By performing truth discovery, accurate sensory data can be obtained,
and such data will greatly promote the effectiveness of CIoT applications.
Although having significantly improved data accuracy, the challenge for
truth discovery, is that the sensory data is highly sensitive and should be well
protected, especially considering that sensory data may contain personal infor-
mation [9, 10, 11]. For example, geo-tagging services can publish timely and
accurate localization of specific objects (e.g., pothole, automated external defib-
rillator, litter, etc.). However, this may lead to exposure of participating users’
sensitive geo-location and/or movement patterns. Aggregated health statistics
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(i.e., treatment outcomes) may provide valuable information regarding medical
devices’ effects or new drugs, but may threaten the privacy of participating pa-
tients. Meanwhile, user reliability (i.e., weight) is another private information
which should be well protected. From user reliability information, the attacker
may infer details of participating users’ education, skills, and personality traits.
For example, aggregating opinions regarding challenging social problems may
lead to a better solution. However, the leakage of reliability may disclose users’
education and intellectual level.
Several studies have tried to preserve users’ privacy in the applications of
truth discovery [7, 8, 12]. However, most of them are not efficient or cannot be
applied in real-life CIoT applications. For example, Du et al[13] tried to find a
reliable key management scheme, Miao et al. [7] proposed a cloud-based privacy-
preserving truth discovery scheme to protect users’ sensory data. However, by
using threshold Paillier cryptosystem [14], their scheme is not efficient. To im-
prove efficiency, Xu et al. [8] proposed a lightweight and privacy-preserving
discovery scheme by using the additive homomorphic privacy-preserving tech-
niques. Miao et al. [12] further designed a lightweight truth discovery framework
by using two non-colluding cloud platforms. Although their schemes achieve
better efficiency, they cannot be applied in CIoT applications, especially in
scenarios where some IoT devices may not deliver their data timely [15]. More-
over, all the above schemes cannot defend from external attackers who inject
false data into the system. Hence, there is a need for an efficient truth discovery
scheme, which not only protects users’ privacy, but is also able to mitigate false
data injection attacks and give fault tolerance.
In this paper, to address these challenges, we present a lightweight privacy-
preserving truth discovery scheme in CIoT, called LPTD-I, to protect devices’
privacy (i.e., sensory data and reliability information), and resist false data
injection attacks. The framework is implemented by involving fog and cloud
platforms, adopting homomorphic Paillier encryption, and one-way hash chain
techniques. In this framework, the fog node authenticates the data submit-
ted from devices and aggregates the data before delivering it to the cloud. In
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addition, we exploit the properties of modular arithmetic to design a data ag-
gregation algorithm which is efficient and privacy preserving.
Although LPTD-I can defend against the false data injection attack launched
by external attackers, it is not fault-tolerant. Thus, we exploit the modified
Paillier cryptosystem and propose a framework (LPTD-II) suitable for the sce-
narios where some IoT devices may stop delivering data due to device failure,
to the fog node. In this framework, the secret key is split into two parts, and
the fog devices can cooperate with the cloud to recover the aggregated results
successfully.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are:
• We propose a novel lightweight and privacy-preserving truth discovery
scheme in CIOT, called LPTD-I. This scheme not only preserves the
privacy of users (i.e., sensory data and reliability information), but also
achieves high efficiency.
• For the scenarios where some IoT devices stop reporting sensory data
to the fog node, an upgraded technique called LPTD-II, is proposed to
achieve fault tolerance.
• Detailed security analysis indicates the proposed schemes are secure un-
der an elaborate threat model. Additionally, experimentation shows the
efficiency of both the proposed schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give the
problem definition which includes the system model, security model, and design
goals. In section 3, we describe some preliminary. The details of the proposed
LPTD schemes are described in section 4, followed by the security analysis and
performance analysis in section 5 and section 6, respectively. In section 7, we
discuss the related work. Finally, we draw the conclusion in the last section.
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2. Problem Definition
The system model, security model, and design goals are outlined in the
following sections.
2.1. System Model
The system model shown in Fig. 1 is comprised of four entities: IoT devices,
the fog node, the cloud, and a trusted authority.
• IoT devices: Each IoT device is equipped with sensing, communication,
and computing capabilities, which can enable the device to collect sensory
data, report data, and perform simple computation operations. Note that,
since most IoT devices are resource-constrained, the computational costs
for operations performed at these devices should be minimal.
• Fog node: The fog node acts as a middle layer between the IoT devices
and the cloud, and is deployed at the edge of network. They can pro-
cess/deliver data for the devices and/or cloud. In our schemes, it also
aggregates all reports from IoT devices, and forwards resulting data to
the cloud.
• Cloud: It receives all data from the IoT devices through the fog node. For
each object, it generates an initial ground truth, and iteratively updates
the truth in cooperation with the fog node.
• Trusted authority (TA): TA is a trusted third party, and it bootstraps the
whole system. It generates keys and assigns them to all entities. Once the
system is up and running, the TA remains offline.
We formalize the truth discovery approach as follows: Suppose there are K
IoT devices and M objects, we use xkm to denote the observed value of device
k for object m. For all devices, {w1, w2, · · · , wK} are used to denote their
reliabilities (i.e., weights). Each object is assigned an initial ground truth. The
goal of the proposed scheme is to calculate the ground truths {x∗m}
M
m=1 for all
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Figure 1: System model.
objects while protecting the observed value and weight of each device from being
disclosed to others. Table 1 summarizes the main notations used in this work.
Table 1: Summary of notations
.
Symbol Definition
K Number of devices
k Index of devices, k ∈ {1, K}
wk Weight of device k
M Number of objects
m Index of objects, m ∈ {1,M}
xkm Observed value of device k for object m
x∗m Truth for the object m
stdm The standard deviation for the m-th object
2.2. Security Model
• TA is considered to be fully trusted, and it cannot be breached by any
attacker.
• The fog and cloud elements are honest-but-curious. This means that they
6
will follow the protocol, but are also curious regarding device/user details.
Note that, in our threat model, they do not collude with each other.
• The honest-but-curious IoT devices will follow the protocols. They can
collude with other entities (i.e., other IoT devices, the fog, and the cloud),
but we emphasize that they cannot collude with the fog and the cloud
simultaneously.
• Since the focus of this work is to design a privacy-preserving truth discov-
ery approach, internal attacks are not considered, i.e., all entities cannot
be compromised at the same time. However, we do allow that some IoT
devices may malfunction or stop reporting data intermittently. Moreover,
external attackers may also launch false data injection attacks. Hence, the
fog node should filter such data before transmitting them to the cloud.
2.3. Design Goals
The goal of the proposed scheme is to design an efficient and privacy-
preserving truth discovery approach which can protect devices’ privacy and
reduce computational costs. Security issues as studied in [16, 17, 18] should
be solved in our work. In order to achieve this, following design goals must be
guaranteed:
• Privacy: The proposed scheme should preserve the privacy. The fog node
and cloud can obtain the truthful values, but they cannot obtain individual
IoT devices’ information (i.e., sensory data and reliability information).
• Security: The scheme should be resistant to false data injection attacks
launched by external attackers. In other words, the fog node should au-
thenticate the IoT devices and filter the false data before transmitting it
to the cloud.
• Fault Tolerance: In case where some IoT devices malfunction and stop
reporting data, the cloud should still be able to obtain acceptable levels
of aggregated data.
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• Efficiency: The computational cost at each system element should be as
little as possible.
3. Preliminaries
In order to better explain the proposed schemes, we first introduce the gen-
eral process of truth discovery and cryptographic tools, in the following parts.
3.1. Truth Discovery
Truth discovery in large scale sensory data has been widely studied in the
past. Although the algorithmic details of different solutions are a bit different
from each other, the fundamental principle of assigning device weights and es-
timating ground truth is same. At the initialization point of truth discovery
algorithm, random ground truths are assigned, which are iteratively updated
until convergence is achieved. Algorithm 1 shows the general truth discovery
process.
Weight Update: In this step, the ground truth of each object is assumed
to be fixed. Typically, a device is assigned higher weight if it provides data,
which is closer to the ground truth, and vice versa. Inspired by the works of
CRH [4] (as it gives good practical performance), we calculate weight as follows:
wk = log(
∑K
k=1
∑M
m=1 d(x
k
m, x
∗
m)∑M
m=1 d(x
k
m, x
∗
m)
) (1)
where d(·) is a distance function utilized to measure the difference between
the ground truth and observation by devices. Moreover, d(·) is dependent on
application use case. The two most common type of data (i.e. continuous and
categorical) are considered in this work.
In applications, such as environmental monitoring, sensory data (e.g., tem-
perature, humidity, etc.) is continuous in nature. Hence the following distance
function is adopted:
d(xkm, x
∗
m) =
(xkm − x
∗
m)
2
stdm
(2)
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where stdm is used to represent the standard deviation of all the users’ obser-
vations for object m.
Other use cases like public opinion polls have collected data that is categor-
ical in nature, that is based on the selection of choices. In these applications,
only one is correct among the multiple candidate choices. Thus, an observa-
tion vector xkm = (0, . . . , 1q
, . . . , 0)T is defined to denote that the k-th device
selects the q-th candidate choice for object m. The following function is used
to measure the distance between the observation vector and the ground truth
vector:
d(xkm, x
∗
m) = (x
k
m − x
∗
m)
T (xkm − x
∗
m) (3)
Truth Update: In this step, weights are assumed to be fixed. We calculate
the ground truth for m-th object as follows:
x∗m ←
∑K
k=1 wk · x
k
m∑K
k=1 wk
(4)
x∗m is considered ground truth, if data is continuous. Contrary to this, x
∗
m
is considered a probability vector where each element represents the probability
of a choice being true, if the data is categorical. In this case, the final ground
truth is the choice with highest probability.
3.2. Cryptographic Tools
In order to perform encryption, we make use of the following algorithms.
3.2.1. Modified Paillier cryptosystem
A modified Paillier cryptosystem to encrypt devices’ sensitive information
[19] is used to realize privacy-preserving truth discovery. This modified Paillier
cryptosystem consists of the following four components:
• Key Generation: Given a security parameter κ, two large safe prime num-
bers p, and q are calculated as p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1, where
|p| = |q| = κ, p′ and q′ are also two large primes. Then, Compute n = pq,
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Algorithm 1: Truth Discovery Algorithm
Input: Observations from K devices: {xkm}
M,K
m,k=1
Output: Ground truths for M objects: {x∗m}
M
m=1
1 Randomly initialize the ground truth x∗m;
2 for iteration = 1, 2, · · · , iterationmax do
3 for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K do
4 Update device weight(see Eq.(1));
5 for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M do
6 Update ground truth (see, Eq.(4))
7 return {x∗m}
M
m=1;
and λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) = 2p′q′. Choose a random value µ ∈ Zn2 ,
and a random number x ∈ [1, λ(n2)/2]. Finally, the public key is set as
pk = (n, g = µ2 mod n2, h = gx), and the secret key is x.
• Encryption: Suppose there is a message m ∈ Zn to be encrypted. Select
a random value r ∈ Zn2 , and calculate the ciphertexts (c1, c2) as c1 =
gr mod n2 and c2 = h
r(1 + n ·m) mod n2.
• Decryption: Given (c1, c2), the messagem can be decrypted by computing
m = c2/(c1)
x−1 modn2
n .
• Proxy Re-encryption: Split the secret key x into two random shares x1, x2,
such that x = x1 + x2. Then, the ciphertexts (c1, c2) can be partially
decrypted as (c˜1, c˜2) by using x1, where c˜1 = c1, and c˜2 = c2/(c1)
x mod
n2. Lastly, (c˜1, c˜2) can be decrypted using x2 to recover m.
3.2.2. One-way hash chain
As a common cryptographic tool, various applications [20] have used one-
way hash chain. In this work, we use this technique to authenticate the IoT
devices. Suppose there is a secure hash function: h : {0, 1}∗ → h : {0, 1}l, a
one-way hash chain can be defined as a set of values (m0,m1, · · · ,mn), where
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mn ∈ {0, 1}
l is randomly chosen, and mi = h(mi+1) for i = 0 to n − 1. Note
that, it is easy to compute mx, where x < y, but becomes computationally
infeasible for mz, if y < z. Fig. 2 depicts the structure of one-way hash chain.݉଴ ݉ଵ ݉ଶ …… ݉௡ିଵ ݉௡
Figure 2: One-way hash chain structure.
3.2.3. Properties under modulo n2
In modified Paillier cryptosystem, for any message mi ∈ Zn, i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
the following equation holds
n∏
i=1
(1 + n ·mi) ≡ (1 + n ·
n∑
i=1
mi) mod n
2. (5)
This property can be easily proven by using mathematical induction, which
can be found in [15].
4. Proposed LPTD Schemes
In this section, we give the details of the proposed two LPTD schemes in
CIoT, which mainly include the following parts: system initialization, design
overview, LPTD-I scheme, and LPTD-II scheme.
4.1. System Initialization
TA is considered to be fully trusted, and it bootstraps the whole system.
Given a security parameter κ, TA selects two large safe prime numbers p, q,
where |p| = |q| = κ. Following this, it then generates the public key pk &
private key sk of the modified Paillier cryptosystem as pk = (n, g, h), sk = x,
where n = p · q, and h = gx mod n2. Then, TA randomly splits sk into two
shares x1 and x2, such that x = x1 + x2. Suppose there are K IoT devices
in the network, TA generates K + 2 vectors [s0, s1, · · · , sK+1], each contains w
random numbers, such that,
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K+1∑
k=0
skj ≡ 0 mod n
2 (6)
where j ∈ [1, w].
TA selects a secure cryptographic hash function h, where {0, 1}∗֌ {0, 1}l.
Since the truth and weight are iteratively updated, we divide the number of iter-
ations into w times, and at every iteration, each device will report its observation
or weighted data. TA generates K one-way hash chains HC1,HC2, · · · ,HCK ,
where HCk = (hk0, hk1, · · · , hkw), hk0 ∈ {0, 1}
∗, and hkj = h(hk(j+1)||j),
1 ≤ k ≤ K, 0 ≤ j ≤ w − 1.
Once these values are configured, TA assigns the keys to devices, fog node,
and cloud elements, as given below:
• For the device k, TA computes Sk = {(g
sk1 , hsk1), (gsk2 , hsk2), · · · , (gskw , hskw)}
and assigns Sk, the hash chain HCk = {hk0, hk1, · · · , hkw}, and the public
key pk.
• For the fog, TA assigns a share of the private key x1, the hash chain
heads of K devices (h10, h20, · · · , hK0), the secret key vector SK+1 =
{hs(K+1)1 , hs(K+1)2 , · · · , hs(K+1)w}, the public key pk , and the shared key
ss to the fog device.
• For the cloud, TA assigns the other share of private key x2, the secret key
vector S0 = {h
s01 , hs02 , · · · , hs0w}, together with the public key pk, and
the same shared key ss.
4.2. LPTD Scheme: General Overview
Once the devices obtain the observed values, LPTD will carry out the fol-
lowing two phases:
• Phase 1: Secure weight update. First, every IoT device encrypts the
observed value by using the cryptographic tool. Then, these ciphertexts
are submitted to the fog node for aggregation and the aggregated value
is further submitted to the cloud to calculate the standard deviation of
12
the observed values, which will be then sent to every device. After that,
every device computes the distances between the observed values and the
ground truths. Finally, the fog and the cloud cooperatively and iteratively
update the weights.
• Phase 2: Secure truth update. When each device receives the ag-
gregated differences from the fog device, they first calculate the weight,
the weighted observed values, and then send them to the fog device in
ciphertexts. Lastly, the fog and the cloud will calculate the ground truth
x∗m.
During the procedure of LPTD, all operations are executed in ciphertexts.
Hence, an entity only knows its own information, and the devices’ sensitive
information (i.e., observed value and weights) is not leaked to other entities.
4.3. LPTD-I Mechanism
In this subsection, we first describe the details of LPTD-I, which is able to
protect the devices’ privacy and resist external false data injection attacks.
It is important to note that the sensory data from IoT devices may not be
integers, but the cryptosystem used in this scheme is defined for integer values.
Thus, to deal with this problem, a parameter T , of magnitude 10, is utilized to
round off the observed values. As an example, device k gets the observed value
xkm for the object m. We can use T to multiply x
k
m as ⌊x
k
m · T ⌋, and the final
result can be recovered by dividing T . For easy understanding in this work,
all observed values and intermediate results are assumed to be preprocessed as
above.
4.3.1. Secure weight update
Step W1. The cloud delivers the estimated ground truth x∗m for object m
to all devices. If it is the first iteration, the estimated ground truth is randomly
initialized. Otherwise, it will be obtained from the previous iteration.
Step W2. When the device k obtains x∗m, it first computes the difference
between xkm and x
∗
m according to Eq. 2, and then aggregates the differences of
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M objects as Distk =
∑M
m=1 d(x
k
m, x
∗
m). Before submitting Distk to the fog
node, the device uses its secret key Skj to compute
Ckj = (1 + n ·Distk) · h
skj mod n2, (7)
and then uses the hash value hkj to compute
mackj = h(Ckj ||hkj), (8)
where j denotes the iteration number. After that, the device submits (Ckj , hkj ,mackj)
to the fog. The operation may not seem time efficient, but they can be efficiently
executed, as hskj has been calculated by TA in advance.
Step W3. After receiving (Ckj , hkj ,mackj) in the j-th iteration, the fog
node checks the validity of the IoT device, and aggregates the reports as follows:
• Check hash chain node hkj : Assume that the fog has authenticated hk(j−1)
in the previous (j − 1)-th iteration, it can easily verify hkj according to
hk(j−1)
?
= (hkj ||j). If it holds, hkj is accepted. Otherwise, it is rejected.
• Check mackj : If hkj is valid, the fog node further verifies mackj by com-
puting
mac
′
kj = h(Ckj ||hkj), (9)
and checking if mac
′
kj
?
= mackj . If it holds, mackj is accepted. Otherwise,
it is rejected.
• Data aggregation: After receiving (C1j , C2j , · · · , CKj) from all devices,
the fog node utilizes its secret key S(K+1)j to obtain the aggregated result
as
Cj =
K∏
k=1
(Ckj) · h
s(K+1)j mod n2, (10)
and then use the shared secret key ss to compute
macj = h(Cj ||j||ss). (11)
Following this, the fog device delivers (Cj ,macj) to the cloud.
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Step W4. Upon receiving (Cj ,macj) in the j-th iteration, the cloud first
checks data validity according to macj = h(Cj ||j||ss). If it holds, the cloud
executes the following operations to obtain the aggregated results.
• The cloud utilizes its secret key S0j to compute
C
′
j = Cj · h
s0j mod n2
= (
K∏
k=1
Ckj) · h
s0j+s(K+1)j mod n2
= (
K∏
k=1
(1 + n ·Distk) · h
skj )× hs0j+s(K+1)j mod n2
=
K∏
k=1
(1 + n ·Distk) ·
K+1∏
k=0
hskj mod n2
= (
K∏
k=1
(1 + n ·Distk) · h
∑K+1
k=0
skj→0 mod n2
=
K∏
k=1
(1 + n ·Distk) mod n
2
from Eq. 5
−→
= 1 + n ·
K∑
k=1
Distk mod n
2.
(12)
• The cloud can obtain
∑k
k=1Distk by computing
sumd =
K∑
k=1
Distk =
C
′
j − 1
n
. (13)
The cloud then selects a random number rj1 ∈ Zn2 to blind sumd as
log(rj1 · sumd) before forwarding it to the fog node.
Step W5. After receiving log(rj1 ·sumd), the fog node selects a random number
rj2 ∈ Zn2 , and computes
log(s˜umd) = log(rj1 · sumd) + log(rj2)
= log(rj1rj2 · sumd).
(14)
15
After that, the fog delivers log(s˜umd) to the device. The device can calculate
its weight as
wk = log(s˜umd)− log(Distk)
= log(rj1rj2 ·
K∑
k=1
Distk)− log(Distk)
= log(
rj1rj2 ·
∑K
k=1Distk
Distk
)
= rj · wk,
(15)
where rj = rj1 · rj2.
As shown in Eq. 2, the standard deviation stdm is necessary to calculate the
difference between the observed value and the ground truth. Thus, it should be
computed first. The calculations can be shown as follows:
• The IoT device k encrypts the observed value xkm according to Eq. 7, and
forwards the ciphertexts to the fog node.
• On reception of ciphertexts, the fog node and the cloud cooperatively
calculate summ =
∑K
k=1 x
k
m, and xm = summ/K following the above
operations, and then send xm to all devices.
• The device k calculates dkm = (x
k
m − xm)
2, and encrypts dkm before up-
loading it to the fog node.
• Upon receiving all the ciphertexts, the fog and the cloud cooperatively cal-
culate sumd =
∑K
k=1 d
k
m, and further obtain stdm as stdm =
√
sumd/K.
At last, stdm is forwarded to all devices.
4.3.2. Secure truth update
Upon updating the weights, it is time to update the ground truth. The
details are shown as follows.
Step T1. The device k calculates the weighted data as rj · x
k
m · wk, and
then encrypts the weighted data and weight as

Wkj,1 = (1 + n · (rj · x
k
m · wk)) · h
skj mod n2
Wkj,2 = (1 + n · (rj · wk)) · h
skj mod n2
(16)
16
Then, following the same operations in secure weight update, k generatesmackj =
(Wkj,1||Wkj,2||hkj), and uploads (Wkj,1,Wkj,2, hkj ,mackj) to the fog node.
Step T2. After checking the data validity, the fog uses its secret key S(K+1)j
and runs the aggregation operations according to Eq. 10. It then uploads
(Wj ,macj) to the cloud.
Step T3. The cloud uses its secret key S0j , and computes rj ·
∑K
k=1(x
k
m ·wk)
and rj · sum
K
k=1wk according to Eq. 12. The cloud then updates the ground
truth as
x∗m =
rj ·
∑K
k=1(x
k
m · wk)
rj ·
∑K
k=1 wk
. (17)
Note that, we only consider continuous data in the proposed scheme. Since
the difference function between continuous and categorical data is different, the
distance between the observed vector xkd and the ground truth vector x
∗
d can be
easily computed according to Eq. 3, which can be seen as a special case in the
proposed LPTD schemes.
After combining the above two procedures, the privacy-preserving truth dis-
covery algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
4.4. LPTD-II Mechanism
In real-life CIoT applications, one IoT device l may not submit its data in
time due to malfunctions, low battery, network delay, etc. Thus, the aggregated
result is not accurate based on the previous operations, because
∑K+1
k=0 sk ≡ 0
mod n2 does not hold. To achieve fault-tolerance, we design another efficient
and privacy-preserving truth discovery approach, call ed LPTD-II. In the fol-
lowing, we only show how to recover the aggregated results from the ciphertexts
in the cloud. Other details are omitted, as they are similar to LPTD-I.
When submitting ciphertexts to the fog node, besides Ckj ,Wk,1,Wk,2, the
device k needs to submit another ciphertext Gkj = g
skj mod n2. Note that,
this ciphertext is also pre-computed by TA, and delivered to the fog node in
advance to save computational cost and communication overhead.
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After receiving Gkj from all devices expect the device j, the fog node first
aggregates them as
Gj =
K∏
k=1,k 6=l
Gkj , (18)
and then uses its share of the secret key x1 to partially decrypt the aggregated
ciphertexts as
Ct,1 =
Cj
(Gj)x1
mod n2. (19)
The cloud further computes
Ct,2 =
Ct,1
(Gj)x2
mod n2 (20)
with x2, and obtains the aggregated result M by calculating
M = (
Ct,2 − 1
n
) mod n2. (21)
5. Security Analysis
The security properties of proposed LPTD schemes are of prime importance.
Here, we show how the proposed schemes can achieve privacy preservation and
effectively defend against false data injection attacks.
Defense against false data injection: To authenticate the validity of data in
each iteration, one-way hash chain technique is applied in the LPTD schemes.
For each device, if the hash value hk(j−1) is authenticated in the (j − 1)-th
iteration, hkj can be authenticated according to hk(j−1) = h(hkj ||j) as it is
hard to obtain hkj from hk(j−1) due to the properties of one-way hash function.
In fact, only if a device reports its data in the j-th iteration, the fog can get a
fresh hkj . If the hkj is not fresh in the j-th iteration, it can be considered as
false data by replaying hkj . The fog can identify and filter this data. Thus, the
proposed LPTD schemes can defend against the false data injection attack.
Privacy preservation: In LPTD schemes, the observed value of a device k is
encrypted as Ckj = (1+n ·m) ·h
skj , if we look at Distkj as a message m. Note
that (1+n·m)·hskj is a valid Paillier ciphertext. An external attacker cannot get
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Algorithm 2: Privacy-Preserving Truth Discovery Algorithm
Input: Observations from K devices: {xkm}
M,K
m,k=1
Output: Ground truths for M objects: {x∗m}
M
m=1
1 The cloud randomly initializes the ground truth {x∗m}
M
m=1.
2 Each device encrypts the observed value xkm as Enc(x
k
m) and Enc(x
k
m)
2,
and sends both to the fog.
3 After receiving all ciphertexts, the fog cooperates with the cloud to
calculate the standard deviation stdm for object m, and delivers it to all
devices.
4 for iteration = 1, 2, · · · , iterationmax do
5 for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K do
6 Each device calculates the difference between xkm and x
∗
m, and the
sum of differences for M objects Distk. Then, Distk is
encrypted as Enc(Distk), and submitted to the fog node.
7 After obtaining Enc(Distk), the fog cooperates with the cloud to
recover log(sumd), and further blind log(sumd) by choosing two
random values rj1 and rj2. Then, log(s˜umd) is delivered to all
devices.
8 After obtaining log(s˜umd) , each device calculates its weight, and
weighed data. Both of them will be uploaded to the fog node
after encryption.
9 for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M do
10 When the fog receives Enc(xkm · wk) and Enc(wk), it cooperates
with the cloud to calculate the ground truth x∗m, and then sends
the truth to all devices.
11 return The ground truths {x∗m}
M
m=1;
m, as the Paillier encryption achieves IND-CPA (i.e., indistinguishable under
the chosen plain text attack). The fog node is also curious about m. However,
without knowing the other share of the secret key x2, it will not be able to
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recover the sensitive data. For the weight information, xkm · wk and wk are
encrypted as Wk,1 and Wk,2 respectively. As Wk,1 and Wk,2 are both Paillier
ciphertexts, an external attacker cannot recover the weight information. Notice
that, the attacker may perform the following operation to calculate the weight,
Wkj,1
Wkj,2
=
1 + n · (rj · x
k
m · wk)
1 + n · (rj · wk)
. (22)
However, since xkm, wk, and rj are unknown, the attacker cannot calculate them
from Eq. 22. The attacker may build more equations to recover xkm as




Wk1,1 = (1 + n · (r1 · x
k
m · wk1)) · h
sk1 mod n2
Wk1,2 = (1 + n · (r1 · wk1)) · h
sk1 mod n2


Wk2,1 = (1 + n · r2 · x
k
m · wk2) · h
sk2 mod n2
Wk2,2 = (1 + n · r2 · wk2) · h
sk2 mod n2
· · ·
(23)
From Eq. 23, we can see that with more equations introduced, more random
numbers (i.e., rj) will be introduced. Since rj = rj1 · rj2, only if the fog node
colludes with the cloud, the attacker can obtain rj . Nevertheless, under our
security model, there is no collusion between the fog and the cloud. Hence, the
scheme preserves the privacy, and passes the security model.
6. Performance Analysis
In addition to security model evaluation, we also perform experimental eval-
uation for communication and computational costs of both proposed schemes.
6.1. Communication Overhead
To show the communication overhead of LPTD, we compare the proposed
schemes with the PPDP [7], which encrypts the data by calculating c = gmrn
mod n2, under the same setting. Here, we assume the bit length of |n2| is
set as U . However, we omit the cost of authentication for all schemes as a
fairness consideration. During the process of weight update in LPTD-I, each
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device needs to submit Enc(Distk), which costs U bits. In PPDP, k needs
to submit Enc(Distk) and Enc(log(Distk)), which cost 2U . In the procedure
of truth update, PPDP and LPTD-I need to submit M · Enc(wkm · wk) and
Enc(wk), which cost (M + 1)U , where M is the number of objects. Compared
with LPTD-I, LPTD-II needs to submit one more gskj mod n2 to execute the
decryption operation. However, in reality, gskj mod n2 can be submitted to the
fog in advance to receive communication overhead, as it is constant. Table 2
summarizes the communication overhead of all schemes in each phase for each
device.
Table 2: Comparison of communication overhead for each CIoT device.
Phase of weight update Phase of truth update
PPDP 2U (M + 1)U
LPTD-I U (M + 1)U
LPTD-II 2U (M + 2)U
6.2. Computational Costs
We compare the computational costs of LPTD and PPDP schemes by im-
plementing all schemes in Java, and run several experiments on a system with
2.5 GHz Intel Core i7 and 16GB RAM. The number of iteration is set as 10, as
average result of 10 experiments are used for comparisons.
As shown in Fig. 3(a), we compare the run time of PPDP with 100 devices
and varying number of objects. It can be observed that as the number of
objects increases, the run time of LPTD remains far less than that of PPDP.
For example, when the number of objects is 800, LPTD-I and LPTD-II cost
8.098s and 8.696s to finish the truth discovery respectively, while PPDP takes
71.172s. This is due to the reason that PPDP needs to perform time-consuming
module exponent operations, while only multiplication operations are required
in LPTD. The single module multiplication operation can be done in advance,
which provides an added benefit. Note that, LPTD-I performs better than
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LPTD-II, since LPTD-II needs to execute 2 decryption operations to recover
the aggregated results, while LPTD-I only needs to perform 2 multiplication
operations.
Similarly, from Fig. 3(b), we can also find that the total running time of
LPTD is less than that of PPDP when the number of devices ranges from
100 to 700, while the number of objects is fixed at 100. When the number of
devices reaches 700, LPTD-I and LPTD-II take 34.079s and 37.606s to finish
the truth discovery respectively, while PPDP needs 136.754s. This also confirms
the efficiency of our scheme.
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Figure 3: (a) Total running time with varying number of objects. (b) Total running time with
varying number of devices.
Fig. 4 shows the run time of weight update and truth update with varying
number of objects. Here, we set the number of devices as 100. As it can be
observed from Fig. 4(a), the run time of PPDP and LPTD are relatively stable.
The reason is that, although more objects are introduced, each device only needs
to perform 2 encryption operations in PPDP, and 1 encryption operation in
LPTD (i.e., (Enc(Distk), Enc(logDistk)) vs. Enc(Distk)) in the weight update
phase. Since PPDP needs to execute module exponent operations, it costs higher
running time than LPTD-I and LPTD-II. In Fig. 4(b), the running time of all
schemes grow linearly. The reason is that more truths need to be updated as
the number of objects increases. It can be also found that PPDP takes higher
time to finish same computations.
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Figure 4: (a) Running time of weight update with varying number of objects. (b) Running
time of truth update with varying number of objects.
Similar observations can be made in Fig. 5. For the procedure of weight
update, since more Distk need to be encrypted with the increasing number
of devices, the run time of all schemes grows linearly. In the procedure of
truth update, as all schemes need to perform more aggregation operations to
calculate
∑K
k=1 x
k
m · wk and
∑K
k=1 wk, the run time forms a linear relation with
the number of devices. Based on these results, we can conclude that LPTD
schemes are more efficient then existing solutions.
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Figure 5: (a) Running time of weight update with varying number of devices. (b) Running
time of truth update with varying number of devices.
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7. Related work
A number of truth discovery schemes have been studied previously [4, 5,
6, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27], and hence can become an attractive solution for
CIoT applications. Among them, CRH [4], AcuSim [5], TruthFinder [25] are
some representative schemes which can provide more reliable results by consid-
ering device reliability in the aggregation process compared to the traditional
voting or averaging approaches. However, these systems fail to take into con-
sideration important privacy issues, which may disclose some personal sensitive
information [28, 29, 30].
To protect devices’ privacy, many privacy-preserving approaches have been
proposed recently. For example, anonymization based schemes are presented by
[14, 31] to protect devices’ private information. However, these cannot be used
in truth discovery scenarios, since they are not designed to protect the data
values. Cryptography based schemes are another option to effectively protect
devices’ privacy. For example, Miao et al. [7] proposed a privacy-preserving
truth discovery scheme by utilizing the threshold Paillier cryptosystem to pro-
tect users’ privacy. However, their system is based on the assumption that there
is no collusion between the cloud server and other parties. When such collusion
occurs, the devices’ privacy can be inferred. Moreover, cryptography schemes
are not efficient, especially considering the battery and computation limitation
of mobile devices. Another scheme [27] integrated the incentive with truth dis-
covery approaches. However, the platform is trusted in their scheme which may
impede its wide adoption. To improve the efficiency, Xu et al. [8] proposed
an efficient and privacy-preserving truth discovery scheme by using an additive
homomorphic data aggregation technique. Specifically, each device is assigned
a random value and secret key, and the sensory data is blinded before deliver-
ing to the cloud. Finally, the authorized receivers can use the secret key and
the aggregated random values to decrypt the ciphertexts. However, in real-life
CIoT applications, device failure or missing data is a common issue. In such
cases, this scheme does not work, since some of the random values are missing.
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Miao et al. [12] further proposed a lightweight and privacy-preserving truth
discovery scheme by using two non-colluding cloud platforms. Specifically, each
device is assigned random values to perturb the sensory data, weighted data,
and the weight. All these perturbed data is submitted to a cloud S1, while the
perturbation values are submitted to another cloud S2. These two clouds can
cooperatively compute the truths without disclosing the sensitive information.
However, similar to [8], their scheme cannot achieve fault-tolerance. Moreover,
if S2 eavesdrops the devices, it may decrypt the sensitive data by using the corre-
sponding perturbation value. Finally, none of these schemes can resist external
false data injection attacks.
8. Conclusion
This article proposes two lightweight and privacy preserving truth discovery
schemes for CIoT. LPTD-I is able to use fog nodes to resist false data injections,
and achieve efficient truth discovery with minimal overhead. LPTD-II is an
extension to previous scheme, which in addition to attack resistance and efficient
privacy preservation, provides fault tolerance. Detailed security analysis shows
that the proposed LPTD schemes are secure under a comprehensive security
model. Experimental evaluation shows significant reduction in computation
times as compared to other schemes.
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PTBI:An Efficient Privacy-Preserving Biometric
Identification Based on Perturbed Term in the Cloud
Chang Xu, Chuan Zhang, and Liehuang Zhu, Member, IEEE,
Abstract—Biometric identification has been increasingly pop-
ular to authenticate individuals’ identities. For efficiency and
economic savings, biometric data owners are motivated to out-
source the identification to a third party, which brings a tradeoff
between the efficiency and privacy protection. In this paper, we
propose a new privacy-preserving biometric identification scheme
which can release the database owner from heavy computation
burden. In the proposed scheme, we design a new biometric data
encryption and matching algorithm by exploiting inherent struc-
tures of biometric data and introducing perturb terms. A through
analysis indicates that our scheme is secure and offers a higher
level of privacy protection than existing biometric identification
outsourcing works. The experimental results further show that
our proposed scheme meets the efficiency need well.
Index Terms—Biometric identification; data outsourcing;
privacy-preserving; cloud computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS Biometric identification is a task to authenticateusers’ identities with biometric data, which includes
fingerprints, irises, facial patterns, etc. Compared with the
traditional authentication methods such as passwords and
identification cards, biometric identification searches the traits
collections to find the best match for a given biometric trait
[1]. As biometric sensors (e.g., fingerprint sensors, etc.) are
becoming smaller and cheaper, automatic identification based
on biometric data is becoming an attractive alternative to the
traditional authentication methods of identification [7].
A typical biometric identification system consists of two
parties including a database owner and users. The database
owner stores a set of biometric data and users can submit
a candidate biometric trait to the database owner for iden-
tification. To release the database owner from the expensive
local storage and heavy computation burden, more and more
companies and governments are motivated to upload their data
to the cloud server for economic and storage savings [2]. When
introducing cloud to the system, sensitive biometric data has
to be encrypted before outsourcing. Specifically, the database
owner encrypts the biometric data and then sends it to the
cloud server. Whenever a user (e.g., a partner of the national
apartments such as a bank) wants to identify an individual’s
(e.g., a banker) identity, the bank will submit a query to the
database owner. Upon receiving the query, the database owner
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executes the query encryption and further turns to the cloud
server for identification.
However, realizing such a biometric identification outsourc-
ing system is challenging considering the requirements of data
privacy and matching efficiency. Several solutions [3], [4], [6],
[9], [10], [11], [12], [14], [15], [16] have been proposed to
try to achieve good tradeoff between efficiency and privacy
protection. However, most of them suffer from efficiency
issues (e.g., based on complex homomorphic encryption for
example) or security drawbacks (e.g., not secure or secure but
under weak attack models). In [11] and [16], homomorphic en-
cryption and obvious transfer were utilized to protect biometric
data privacy. However, with computation costs introduced,
their schemes failed to support a large database. Recently,
Huang et al. [3] proposed a privacy-preserving biometric
identification scheme based on homomorphic encryption and
garbled circuits. Compared with [11] [16], Huang et al.’s
scheme can support a larger database up to 1GB. However,
as a secure two-party system, their scheme cannot be applied
in the outsourcing model directly. To suit the outsourcing
demands, Yuan and Yu [4] proposed a cloud-based privacy-
preserving biometric identification scheme. However, Zhu et
al. [5] and Wang et al. [6] pointed out that Yuan and Yu’s
scheme was not secure. To solve the drawbacks, Wang et al.
[6] moreover proposed a biometric identification scheme by
introducing random diagonal matrices. Note that Wang et al.’s
scheme was based on a weaker attack model compared with
[4]. If the attacker has the ability to collude with the cloud
server, simultaneously observe some biometric data and quires
at the same time, their scheme can be completely broken.
In this paper, for the first time, we propose a scheme which
achieves a higher level of privacy protection than existing
works and obtains high identification efficiency. Specifically,
in our scheme, the pre-processed biometric data is encrypted
and outsourced to the cloud server. When a user needs to
identify a biometric trait, the user submits the query to
the database owner where the query will be extended and
encrypted. After receiving the query, the cloud server searches
the encrypted database and returns the index of the matching
ciphertext to the database owner, where the FingerCodes’
Euclidean distance can be efficiently computed. Different
from previous works, we exploit inherent structures of the
biometric data and introduce some perturbed terms into the
data before performing encryption. Our main contributions can
be summarized as follows:
• This paper proposes efficient privacy-preserving biomet-
ric identification solutions for high privacy requirements.
We enable our scheme to securely outsource the biometric
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database to the cloud server and efficiently perform
the identification without compromising data privacy.
As shown in Fig.1, compared with previous works, our
scheme achieves a higher level of privacy protection, as
most existing works require the attacker cannot has the a-
bility to observe the biometric data and the corresponding
ciphertexts. Wang et al. [6] and Zhu et al. [5] even claim
that the attack based on this ability is too strong that there
exists no effective schemes to defend against. Our scheme
is designed to omit this strong assumption. Moreover, as
shown in Section IV, the identification efficiency in our
scheme is higher than existing solutions. To the best of
our knowledge, the proposed scheme for the first time
gives consideration well to the efficiency and privacy pro-
tection in the biometric outsourcing identification system.
• This paper establishes a set of strict privacy requirements,
see Section II-B. To the best of our knowledge, such
requirements result in the most strict attack model in the
biometric outsourcing identification system. To defend
against the collusion attack of a Level-II attacker, we
exploit the structure of the query data and design the
PTBI-I scheme. To resist the strong attack of a Level-III
attacker, we insert some variables into the biometric data
to increase the randomness and further design the PTBI-
II scheme. The security analysis indicates that our PTBI
schemes are secure under Level-II and Level-III attack
respectively.
• This paper proposes an efficient biometric data encryption
and secure outsouced matching scheme. To release the
database owner from the tremendous computation burden,
we use random matrices and vectors to execute the data
encryption and matching. Compared with the works [4],
[6] utilizing the same encryption method, the proposed
scheme is tailored to suit a higher level of privacy and
efficiency requirement. For example, when encrypting the
biometric data, we execute fewer matrices multiplication
operations than [4] which resulting in less data encrypting
time. And since we transmit the matrix multiplications to
vector-matrix multiplications, the identification time in
out scheme can significantly save as much as 73.4% cost
than [6].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II presents the problem formulation, including system model,
threat model and our design goals. In Section III, we provide
our construction, including two schemes with correctness and
security analysis followed. Performance analysis is presented
in Section IV. In Section V, we give the related work and our
conclusion is presented in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
Considering a cloud-based biometric identification system
involves three different entities, as shown in Fig.2: the database
owner, users and the cloud server. The database owner out-
sources the encrypted database to the cloud server. When
identifying a user’s identify, a query will be transmitted to
the database owner and further uploaded to the cloud server.
Fig. 1. Architecture of the cloud-based biometric-identification system.
More specifically, the database owner owns a set of biometric
data (e.g., fingerprints, voice patterns, facial patterns, etc.).
For convenience of database search, the database owner will
build an index I for each biometric data. Then the index and
the encrypted biometric data are both outsourced to the cloud
server. When identifying a candidate biometric data, a query is
submitted to the database owner by a user. After receiving the
query, the database owner executes the encryption and then
uploads the ciphertext to the cloud server. Upon receiving the
ciphertext, the cloud server is responsible to find the best
match and returns the corresponding index to the database
owner. Subsequently, the database owner computes the Eu-
clidean distance between the candidate biometric data and
the plaintext corresponding to the returned index. Finally, the
database owner checks the distance with the defined threshold
and returns the final result to the user.
We assume the biometric data (e.g., fingerprint data) either
in the user side or the database owner side has been processed
such that the representation of the biometric data is fit for the
encryption and matching. In this work, we focus on fingerprint
identification and obtain the fingerprint data following the
feature extraction algorithm [7]. In our scheme, a FingerCode
with n elements (typically n = 640) is utilized to represent a
fingerprint image.
Given two FingerCodes b1 = [b11, b12, · · · , b1n] and b2 =
[b21, b22, · · · , b2n], their Euclidean distance is defined as:
dist12 =
√√√√
n∑
j=1
(b1j − b2j)2 (1)
If the Euclidean distance is below the defined threshold, the
two FingerCodes can be considered from the same person.
Therefore, the process of identifying a candidate biometric
data can be described as follows: candidate FingerCodes
encryption, secure Euclidean distance computation, best match
finding and result retrieval. The database owner executes
the first and the last steps, and others are executed on the
cloud server side. In our cloud-based biometric identification
scheme, to improve the efficiency, the time-consuming match-
ing operations are outsourced to the cloud server.
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the cloud-based biometric-identification system.
B. Threat Model
In our scheme, users and the cloud server are both con-
sidered as semi-honest. They will honestly execute the tasks
as designed protocol but try to disclose privacy as much as
possible. We assume the adversary has the ability to know the
encrypted database, the encrypted queries and all the values
computed in the cloud server. Based on what the adversary
knows, we consider our threat model as follows:
• Level-I: The adversary can observe the encrypted
database and the encrypted queries in the cloud server.
• Level-II: On the basis of Level-I, the adversary has the
ability to observe some biometric data in the biometric
database, but has no idea about the corresponding cipher-
texts.
• Level-III: On the basis of Level-II, the adversary can
observe some plaintexts in the database and know the
corresponding ciphertexts. Moreover, the adversary can
be a valid user and construct some queries of his interests.
C. Design Goals
To enable the efficient identification in the cloud server
under the aforementioned model, the design goals of our
scheme should achieve privacy protection and efficiency as
follows:
• privacy protection: The system should prevent the cloud
server and the adversary from learning additional infor-
mation except for what they have known. Specifically, the
system should defend against Level-III attack.
• Efficiency: The system should outsource the most time-
consuming identification operations to the cloud server.
III. OUR CONSTRUCTION: THE PTBI-I AND PTBI-II
SCHEME
To efficiently achieve candidate FingerCode identification,
the “inner product similarity” [8] is employed to quantitatively
formalize the efficient matching. In this section, we first
propose a privacy-preserving efficient biometric identification
under Level-II attack. This scheme is named as PTBI-I. Then,
we present an enhanced scheme named PTBI-II which can
achieve security under Level-III attack.
A. PTBI-I: The Basic Scheme
1) Biometric Database Encryption Phase: As described in
Section II-A, the fingerprint image is assumed to be pre-
processed using the extraction algorithm and generated as a
FingerCode bi. The FingerCode bi = [bi1, bi2, · · · , bin] is an
n-dimension vector with each element’s size l bits (typically,
n = 640 and l = 8). To facilitate the identification matching,
the FingerCode is extended to (n+2)-dimension vector as Bi,
where the (n+1)-th element is set to −0.5(b2i1+b
2
i2+· · ·+b
2
in)
and the (n+ 2)-th dimension is 1. For biometric data protec-
tion, the encryption operations are performed as follows:
Step 1: The database owner randomly generates secret keys
involving two (n+2)×(n+2) invertible matrices as {M1,M2}
and one (n+ 2)-dimension vector as H , where each element
in the secret keys is a random value with the same size as the
elements in the FingerCode.
Step 2: For protection of each extended FingerCode Bi, a
random (n+ 2)× (n+ 2) matrix Di is generated to hide the
biometric data as:
Di =


A11∗bi1 A12∗bi1 ··· A1(n+2)∗bi1
A21∗bi2 A22∗bi2 ··· A2(n+2)∗bi2
...
...
. . .
...
A(n+2)1∗bi(n+2) A(n+2)2∗bi(n+2) ··· A(n+2)(n+2)∗bi(n+2)


(2)
where Ai = [Ai1, Ai2, · · · , Ai(n+2)] (i ∈ [1, n + 2]) is set as
a random vector, and satisfies the requirement Ai ×H
T = 1.
More specifically, FingerCode BTi can be recovered by using
the secret key H and the matrix Di as Di ×H
T = BTi .
Step 3: After hiding the FingerCode, the database owner
further executes encryption as follows:
Ci = M
−1
1 ×Di ×M2 (3)
After encryption, the database owner builds an index Ii and
associates it with the FingerCode bi and its encrypted form
Ci. Then, the tuple {Ci, Ii} is uploaded to the cloud server
for storage.
2) Biometric Data Matching Phase: In this phase, the query
will be encrypted. Before executing query encryption, we first
give the definition of the secure Euclidean distance which
serves as the similarity measurement in our scheme.
Definition 1: secure Euclidean distance
The FingerCode which has the minimum Euclidean distance
with the query is needed to be figured out. However, it is
not necessary to compute all Euclidean distances to identify
the closest one. For example, given two FingerCodes b1, b2
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and a query bc. Their secure Euclidean distance S12 can be
computed as follows:
S12 = dis
2
1c − dist
2
2c
=
n∑
j=1
(b1j − bcj)
2 −
n∑
j=1
(b2j − bcj)
2
=
n∑
j=1
(b21j − b
2
2j) + 2
n∑
j=1
(b2j − b1j)bcj
(4)
Base on the equation 4, the FingerCode which has smaller
distance with the query can be identified by checking the pos-
itive or negative of S12 =
∑n
j=1 (b
2
1j − b
2
2j) + 2
∑n
j=1(b2j −
b1j)bcj without knowing the Euclidean distance.
Step 4: When identifying a candidate FingerCode, a
user submits a query FingerCode to the database own-
er. The database owner then extends the query to Bc =
[bc1, bc2, · · · , bcn, 1, rc], where rc is a random positive value.
Note that, rc is chosen differently. Then, the database owner
executes the following operation:
CF = Bc ×M1 (5)
After encrypting the query, the database owner further
encrypts H as:
CH = M
−1
2 ×H
T (6)
where M−12 is the inverse matrix of M2.
The tuple {CF , CH} is then uploaded to the cloud server
for identification.
Step 5: Upon receiving the encrypted query, the cloud
server begins to compute the similarity between the query
and the encrypted biometric data. Let Pi denote the similarity
score, the computation of Pi is executed as follows:
Pi = CF × Ci × CH
= Bc ×M1 ×M
−1
1 ×Di ×M2 ×M
−1
2 ×H
T
= Bc ×B
T
i
=
n+1∑
j=1
bcj ∗ bij + rc
(7)
Then the cloud server ranks similarity score Pi, and returns
the top-1 ranked index to the database owner.
3) Final Matching Computation Phase: We should note
that the Index returned from the cloud server represents the
FingerCode which has the minimum Euclidean distance with
the query in the database. Since the exact Euclidean distance
is not known, the database owner needs to compute the exact
distance between bi and bc as shown in equation 1 to identify
if these two FingerCodes belong to the same person.
Step 6: After receiving the Index Ii, the database owner
gets the corresponding biometric data bi and computes the Eu-
clidean distance distic between bi and bc. Then, by checking
distic < defined threshold, bc is identified, otherwise, denied.
Finally, the database owner returns the final result to the user.
Correctness Analysis As shown in equation 7, Pi is an
integer and the sign of Pi − Pz can be computed as follows:
Pi − Pz = (
n+2∑
j=1
bij ∗ bcj)− (
n+2∑
j=1
bzj ∗ bcj)
= (
n∑
j=1
bij ∗ bcj − 0.5(
n∑
j=1
b2ij) + rc)−
(
n∑
j=1
bzj ∗ bcj − 0.5(
n∑
j=1
b2zj) + rc)
= 0.5(
n∑
j=1
(b2zj − b
2
ij) + 2
n∑
j=1
(bij − bzj)bcj)
= 0.5(dist2zc − dist
2
ic)
= −0.5Siz
(8)
According to the Definition 1, Siz is an representation of
the secure Euclidean distance. The cloud server can get the
similarity by checking the sign of Pi − Pz, 1 ≤ i, z ≤ m
and i 6= z. More specifically, if Pi − Pz > 0, the cloud
server gets distzc > distic which indicates bi better matches
the query. Otherwise, cloud gets distzc < distic. Therefore,
the largest similarity score indicates the minimum Euclidean
distance. After repeating the matching process for all the
encrypted database, the cloud server only needs to find the
largest similarity score and returns the corresponding index.
Security Analysis
Theorem 1. PTBI-I scheme is secure under Level-II attack.
Proof of Theorem 1. See Appendix A.
B. PTBI-II: The Enhanced Scheme
PTBI-I scheme achieves identification efficiency and also
provides privacy protection under Level-II attack, but it will
lead to privacy leakage under Level-III attack. Specifical-
ly, the cloud server can get all the values of similarity
scores according to the equation Pi = CF × Ci × CH .
When the attacker has the ability to observe < Bi, Ci >
(1 ∈ [1,m]) and construct query bc, rc can be recovered as
Pi−
∑n
j=1 bijbcj−0.5
∑n
j=1 b
2
ij . Following the same way, the
attacker can construct query b′l and get the encryption random
rl, where l ∈ [1, t]. After that, for unknown biometric data
bk, the cloud server can compute bk according to the equation
Pk =
∑n
j=1 bkjb
′
lj−0.5
∑n
j=1 b
2
kj+rl. To achieve higher level
of privacy protection, we further propose an enhanced scheme
to introduce more randomness when encrypting the biometric
data.
The key difference between the PTBI-I and PTBI-II scheme
is that the database owner introduces some randomness
in the similarity score. Besides introducing the random-
ness in the query, the database owner inserts a random
variable into each biometric data. All the vectors are ex-
tended to (n + 3)-dimension instead of (n + 2) and all
the matrices are extended to (n + 3) × (n + 3). More
specifically, Bi = [bi1, bi2, · · · ,−0.5
∑n
j=1 b
2
ij , 1, εi], Bc =
[bc1, bc2, · · · , 1, rc, 1], where εi is a random variable.
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The remaining operations for the biometric database en-
cryption phase, biometric data matching phase are the same
as PTBI-I scheme.
Correctness Analysis In PTBI-II scheme, the cloud server
computes the similarity score as Pi =
∑n+1
j=1 bcj ∗ bij+rc+εi.
Because randomness εi is introduced as a part of the similarity
score, the search result may not be as accurate as that in PTBI-
I scheme. However, considering the obvious differentia among
the different FingerCodes, if εi is controlled in an appropriate
scope, the search result can be considered as the expected
one. In this scheme, we let εi follow a normal distribution
N(0, σ2).
Security Analysis Apparently, the introduction of the ran-
dom variable εi will not compromise the security requirements
of PTBI-I, thus PTBI-II is still secure under Level-II attack.
As for Level-III attack, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. PTBI-II scheme is secure under the Level-III
attack.
Proof of Theorem 2. See Appendix B.
Moreover, we compare the security with other two schemes
in terms of our threat models. In Table I, we can see only our
PTBI-II scheme achieves security under all three level attacks.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
To evaluate the performance of our schemes, we implement
PTBI-I and PTBI-II schemes by using C language. The cloud
server is set up with 2 nodes each with 6-core 2.10 GHz In-
ter(R) Xeous(R) CPU E5-2620 V2 and 32 GB of memory. For
the database owner, we use a laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM)
2.40GHz CPU and 8 GB of memory. We randomly generate
640-dimensional vectors as the FingerCodes to construct the
biometric database and randomly select some of the Fnger-
Codes as the queries to complete the identification task.
A. Complexity Analysis
Before implementing our scheme, we first analyze the
complexity of our PIBI-I scheme and PTBI-II scheme. As
described in Section III, our schemes can be decomposed
into three stages. In stage 1, the whole biometric database
is encrypted. For each biometric data, the database owner
executes matrix multiplication operations. Note that, each
matrix multiplication has a time complexity of O(n3), where
n is the dimension of the FingerCode. We assume there exists
m FingerCodes needed to be encrypted, the total complexity
in stage 1 is O(m ∗ n3). In stage 2, a query is submitted
to the database owner. To execute the query encryption, the
database owner performs vector-matrix multiplication, which
costs O(n2). Similar to the previous analysis, the encryption of
H also costs O(n2). For the cloud server side, the operation of
matrix multiplying vectors is needed to process the similarity
score computation, which costs O(n2). Assuming there exists
m encrypted biometric data, to figure out the FingerCode
which has the minimum Euclidean distance with the query, the
total computation complexity is O(m∗n2+mlogm). Note that,
the identification phase can be executed in parallel on the cloud
server, which can ensure our scheme is efficient. In stage 3,
the database owner computes the Euclidean distance between
the query and the FingerCode according to the returned index,
which costs O(n). As shown in the TABLE II, compared with
other schemes, the complexity in our scheme is the lowest in
all stages.
B. Experimental Evaluation
Preparation phase: Fig.3 and Fig.4 show the time cost
and the bandwidth consumption in the preparation phase.
Considering the biometric data encryption is a one-time cost,
the preparation time in all schemes grow linearly as the
the number of FingerCodes increases. As shown in Fig.3,
the preparation time is almost the same as PTBI-I, PTBI-
II and Wang et al.’s scheme, which confirms the theoretical
analysis in TABLE II. As Yuan and Yu’s scheme executes more
encryption operations, it takes more time than the other three
schemes. The bandwidth consumptions of all four schemes,
as shown in Fig.4, are almost the same. Note that this is a
one-time cost cost which can be bypassed by using hard disk
drive transmission services to save bandwidth consuming.
Fig. 3. Time costs for different number of FingerCodes in preparation phase.
Fig. 4. Bandwidth costs for different number of FingerCodes in preparation
phase.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 6
TABLE I
SECURITY COMPARISON WITH OTHER SCHEMES.
Schemes Level-I attack Level-II attack Level-III attack
Yuan and Yu’s scheme [5] Yes Yes No
Wang et al.’s scheme [7] Yes Yes No
PTBI-I scheme Yes Yes No
PTBI-II scheme Yes Yes No
TABLE II
A SUMMARY OF COMPLEXITY COSTS:m DENOTES THE NUMBER OF THE BIOMETRIC DATA; n DENOTES THE DIMENSION OF THE FINGERCODE, n≪ m.
Schemes Preparation Phase Query Encryption Identification Phase Retrieval
Yuan and Yu’s scheme [5] O(mn3) O(n3) O(mn2 +mlogm) O(n)
Wang et al.’s scheme [7] O(mn3) O(n3) O(mn3 +mlogm) O(n)
PTBI-I scheme O(mn3) O(n3) O(mn2 +mlogm) O(n)
PTBI-II scheme O(mn3) O(n3) O(mn2 +mlogm) O(n)
Identification phase: Fig.5 and Fig.6 show the time cost
and the bandwidth consumption in the identification phase.
As shown in Fig.5, since PIBI-I and PTBI-II have the same
complexity costs and computation operations, the time costs
are almost the same. As Yuan and Yu’s scheme has more
vector multiplication operations, it takes a little more time than
ours. Compared with Wang et al.’s scheme, since the matrix
multiplications are transmitted to vector-matrix multiplications
when computing the similarity scores, our schemes can save
as much as 73.4% time cost. For bandwidth consumption
of a query, as shown in Fig.6, the growth of the number
of the FingerCodes will not influence the cost of our PTBI
schemes, which is about 1.25 KB. Nevertheless, the bandwidth
consumption in [4] and [6] is also constant, but costs about
400 KB. The reason is that when performing the identification,
our schemes only need to transmit two vectors while other two
schemes need to upload a matrix.
Fig. 5. Time costs for different number of FingerCodes in identification phase.
Fig. 6. Bandwidth costs for different number of FingerCodes in identification
phase.
V. RELATED WORK
Recently, privacy protection and efficiency models on bio-
metric identification have been studied well [3], [4], [6], [9],
[10], [11], [12], [14], [15], [16], most of which are trying to
find a tradeoff between the efficiency and privacy protection.
Wang and Hatzinakos [9] proposed a privacy-preserving face
recognition scheme. By measuring the similarity between
stored index numbers vectors, the expected one can be i-
dentified. Wong and Kim [10] presented a privacy-preserving
biometric identification scheme. However, their scheme is
computationally infeasible if a malicious client impersonates
an honest user. To enhance privacy protection, in [11], a new
privacy-preserving biometric identification protocol is pro-
posed by Barni et al. By using homomorphic encryption, their
scheme can guarantee biometric data privacy. Nevertheless,
to compute distances between the query with all matched
fingerprints, heavy computation burden will be introduced for
a large biometric database. Osadchy introduced a privacy-
preserving scheme for identification with face image utilizing
oblivious transfer [16]. It can also achieve privacy protection
in a higher level, but still suffers from efficiency problem. To
better balance the efficiency and privacy protection, Huang et
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al. [3] and Blanton et al. [12] proposed biometric identification
schemes which combine homomorphic encryption and garbled
circuits. Specifically, they use homomorphic encryption to
compute Euclidean distance and garbled circuits to find the
minimum distance. However, as a client leading system, their
schemes need to transmit the entire encrypted database from
the database owner to the client side for each query. Similar
to the former solutions [9], [10], [11], their schemes are
still two-party protocols, which heavily rely on the hardware
performance for both owner side and client side. To omit the
local hardware limitations, it is considered to be a promising
future to outsource the identification operations to a third party
(e.g., the cloud server) and many solutions [4] [6] [13] [14]
[15] are proposed. Wong et al. [13] proposed a kNN-based
identification scheme which provides a new way to securely
search for the encrypted database. Hu et al. [14] proposed
a new outsourcing scheme which can achieve the database
security and privacy-preserving outsourcing separately. How-
ever, all these schemes are based on the assumption that there
is no collusion between the third outsourcing party and the
client side, which may produce privacy disclosure problems.
To achieve a higher security level, a secure kNN query scheme
is proposed by Elmehdwi et al. [15]. But their scheme suffers
from the problems such as leakage of secret keys and low
efficiency.
In 2013, Yuan and Yu [4] developed an efficient privacy-
preserving biometric identification in cloud computing. They
use matrix to design encryption scheme in the outsourcing
model and the performance indicates that their computational
costs are several magnitudes lower than the previous works.
They claimed that their scheme can resist the known-plaintext
attack (KPA) and the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA). Unfor-
tunately, Zhu et al. [5] and Wang et al. [6] pointed out that
their scheme can be completely broken if there exists collusion
between the client side and the cloud server. Moreover, Wang
et al. [6] presented a new cloud-based practical privacy-
preserving outsourcing of biometric identification scheme by
introducing more random diagonal matrices to resist KPA and
CPA attacks. However, Wang et al.’s scheme is based on a
weaker attack model than [4]. Specifically, they assume the
attacker cannot has the ability to collude with the cloud server,
simultaneously observe some plaintexts of the database and
construct quires at the same time. They claim that this attack
is too strong that there exists no effective schemes which
can defend against this attack. In this paper, we omit this
assumption by introducing perturbed terms to each biometric
data. Compared with previous works, our scheme achieves a
higher level of privacy protection and gives consideration well
to the efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, for the first time, our proposed scheme
achieves a higher level of privacy protection and identification
efficiency than state-of-art biometric identification outsourcing
schemes. Among various encryption methods for biometric
traits, we utilize matrix and perturbed terms to protect data
privacy and design a new encryption scheme to efficiently find
the best match in the cloud server. The security and experi-
ments analysis indicate that our scheme can give consideration
well to the privacy protection and efficiency. In future, we will
work on designing more efficient privacy-preserving biometric
identification schemes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to Level-II attack, the attacker has the ability
to observe the encrypted data {Ci, CF , CH} in the cloud
server. We first consider Ci. The database owner generates
Ci with a random matrix Di and the secret keys M1, M2.
Since Di is randomly generated, the attacker cannot recover
the biometric data from the known knowledge. CF and CH
are both encrypted by the secret keys, without knowing the
query Bc, the attacker cannot learn the additional sensitive
information from the encryption database.
In a Level-II attack, the attacker can get some plaintexts in
the database owner, but has no idea about the mapping rela-
tionship between the plaintexts and the ciphertexts. Without
knowing the mapping relationship, there is no way for the
adversary to recover the biometric data.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to Level-III attack, besides the ability mentioned
in Level-II, the attacker can i) know the mapping relation-
ship between the plaintexts and ciphertexts in the biometric
database, and ii) be a valid user and construct query bc.
As what discussed in Theorem 1, the attacker cannot recover
the biometric data from the encrypted database. We first
consider the mapping relationship is known to the adversary,
which means the attacker can know the plaintext bi and the
corresponding ciphertext Ci. Based on what gets from the
cloud server, the attacker has:
CF × Ci = Bc ×M1 ×M
−1
1 ×Di ×M2
= Bc ×Di ×M2
(9)
Because Di is randomly generated, the attacker cannot
recover the query Bc and M2.
The attacker can also execute the multiplication between Ci
and CH , denoted as CHi, as:
CHi = Ci × CH
= M−11 × B
T
i
(10)
In this equation, M−11 is a matrix with (n + 3) × (n + 3)
unknown elements. To recover M−11 , the attacker can select
bi (i ∈ [1, t]) to execute the computation as shown in equation
10. For the j-th row vector m−1j = [m
−1
j1 ,m
−1
j2 , · · · ,m
−1
j(n+3)]
in M−11 , 1 ≤ j ≤ (n+ 3), the attacker has:


.
C(H1)1 = m
−1
j1 b11 +m
−1
j2 b12 + · · ·+m
−1
j(n+3)ε1
C(H2)1 = m
−1
j1 b21 +m
−1
j2 b22 + · · ·+m
−1
j(n+3)ε2
· · ·
C(Ht)1 = m
−1
j1 bt1 +m
−1
j2 bt2 + · · ·+m
−1
j(n+3)εt
(11)
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where there are t equations with strictly t+ n+3 unknowns.
Thus, the attacker cannot compute M−1j , which means M
−1
1
cannot be recovered.
We further consider the attacker can be a valid user and
construct query bc. Note that bc is an n-dimension vector (Bc
is the encrypted form with (n + 3) elements, where the last
three are set as 1, random variable rc and 1). According to
the knowledge of linear algebra, there is at most n linearly
independent {bc1, bc2, . . . , bcn} can be generated to represent
bc as
bc = x1bc1 + x2bc2 + · · ·+ xnbcn (12)
where {x1, x2, · · · , xn} is a set of coefficients. After bc is
extended as Bc, the attacker has
Bc = x1Bc1 + x2Bc2 + · · ·+ xnBcn (13)
Thus, CF can be represented as
CF = (x1Bc1 + x2Bc2 + · · ·+ xnBcn)M1
= x1Bc1M1 + x2Bc2M1 + · · ·+ xnBcnM1
(14)
From this equation, we can see at most n linearly inde-
pendent pairs of (Bcj , CFj) can be built by an ideal attacker,
where 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Without loss of generality, we assume the
attacker chooses a basis Bc1 = [1, 0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, rc1, 1], Bc2 =
[0, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 1, rc2, 1], . . . , Bcn = [0, 0, 0, . . . , 1, 1, rcn, 1] in
the n-dimensional vector space. Then the attacker has:
CF1 = Bc1M1
= [1, 0, 0, · · · , 0, 1, rc1, 1]

p11 p12 ··· p1(n+1) p1(n+2) p1(n+3)
p21 p2 ··· p2(n+1) p2(n+2) p2(n+3)
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
p(n+1)1 p(n+1)2 ··· p(n+1))(n+1) p(n+1)(n+2) p(n+1)(n+3)
p(n+2)1 p(n+2)2 ··· p(n+2))(n+1) p(n+2)(n+2) p(n+2)(n+3)
p(n+3)1 p(n+3)2 ··· p(n+3)(n+1) p(n+3)(n+2) p(n+3)(n+3)


= [p11 + p(n+1)1 + rc1p(n+2)1 + p(n+3)1, p12 + p(n+1)2
+ rc1p(n+2)2 + p(n+3)2, · · · , p1(n+3) + p(n+1)(n+3)
+ rc1p(n+2)(n+3) + p(n+3)(n+3)]
...
CFn = BcnM1
= [pn1 + p(n+1)1 + rcnp(n+2)1 + p(n+3)1, pn2 + p(n+1)2
+ rcnp(n+2)2 + p(n+3)2, · · · , pn(n+3) + p(n+1)(n+3)
+ rcnp(n+2)(n+3) + p(n+3)(n+3)]
(15)
The attacker will try to recoverM1, e.g., qij . For example, the
attacker chooses CF1, and has


.
C(F1)1 = p11 + p(n+1)1 + rc1p(n+2)1 + p(n+3)1
C(F1)2 = p12 + p(n+1)2 + rc1p(n+2)2 + p(n+3)2
· · ·
C(F1)(n+3) = p1(n+3) + p(n+1)(n+3) + rc1p(n+2)(n+3)
+ p(n+3)(n+3)
(16)
where there are n+3 equations with 4(n+3)+ 1 unknowns.
Thus, the ideal attacker cannot recover M1.
As for the matching process in the cloud server, according
to the equation 7, in PTBI-II scheme, the similarity score is
computed as follows:
Pi = CF × Ci × CH
=
n∑
j=1
bijbcj − 0.5
n∑
j=1
b2ij + rc + εi
(17)
the attacker can use the same attack methods to bypass the
computation of the secret keys and derive the unknown query
FingerCode directly from other honest users. By selecting t
biometric data {b1, b2, · · · , bt} and corresponding ciphertexts
{C1, C2, · · · , Ct}, the attacker has:

.
P 1 =
n∑
j=1
b1jbcj − 0.5
n∑
j=1
b21j + rc + ε1
P2 =
n∑
j=1
b2jbcj − 0.5
n∑
j=1
b22j + rc + ε2
· · ·
Pt =
n∑
j=1
btjbcj − 0.5
n∑
j=1
b2tj + rc + εt
(18)
Following the same analysis as above, there are t equations
with t+ 1 unknowns. Thus, the ideal attacker cannot recover
the query as well.
We then consider the attacker can be a valid user and
recover the unknown biometric data bk by constructing query
b′l (l ∈ [1, t]). Following the same analysis, after constructing
t queries, the attacker has:

.
P 1 =
n∑
j=1
bkjb
′
1j − 0.5
n∑
j=1
b2kj + rc1 + εk
P2 =
n∑
j=1
bkjb
′
2j − 0.5
n∑
j=1
b2kj + rc2 + εk
· · ·
Pt =
n∑
j=1
bkjb
′
tj − 0.5
n∑
j=1
b2kj + rct + εk
(19)
where there are t equations with t+1 unknowns, the attacker
cannot recover the unknown biometric data as well.
Based on the above analysis, the attacker cannot access the
private biometric data or recover the secret keys by building
enough knowledge. Therefore, PTBI-II scheme is secure under
Level-III attack.
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